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3.1    Introduction
The demographic prospects in Denmark are, like those in most other 
rich Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries, characterized by an increasing share of elderly people, that is, 
until the middle of the century. A decline in fertility, a trend until recently 
toward earlier retirement, and longer expected lifetimes interact to increase 
the share of elderly people in the population with derived impacts on the 
economy in many diﬀerent ways; that is, on the public sector budget and 
on the relative as well as the absolute size of the labor force, unless policy 
changes are enacted.
A major part of the trend toward earlier retirement is, apart from the 
impact from higher incomes and wealth, explained by the introduction of 
programs for early retirement, either directly or by expanding other retire-
ment programs with an early retirement option, intended to reduce youth 
unemployment and increase welfare for eligible older workers retiring 
through these programs. In this chapter we concentrate on the question 
of whether older workers retiring earlier from the labor force create job 
openings for young workers. If the number of jobs in the economy were of 
a given magnitude, there would exist a substitution of jobs between older 
and younger workers, which some might invoke as an argument in support 
of early retirement programs.
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1. This is in contrast to the increase in eligibility ages enacted in most countries. The rational 
explanation of this change of rules is the fact that most people sixty-  ﬁ  ve and sixty-  six years 
old were in an early retirement program—the PEW, compare following—with higher beneﬁ  ts 
than the OAP.
The purpose of the present chapter is to study the eventual evidence for or 
against this substitution hypothesis over the thirty years up to the turn of the 
century, using microdata for employment, unemployment, and enrollment 
in education for diﬀerent age groups in the Danish economy. In section 3.2 
we describe brieﬂ  y the demographic perspectives in Denmark along with the 
main elements of social security retirement programs. There are a number of 
important and potentially very informative policy reforms—performing as 
natural experiments—during this period that are exploited to provide varia-
tion identifying our estimated models. Next, section 3.3 contains a number 
of descriptive indicators of employment and unemployment for the young, 
the prime aged, and the older group organized around the policy changes 
that occurred between 1971 and 2001. Section 3.4 contains a number of 
regression results with the aim of getting a measure of the simple correla-
tions between employment, unemployment, and labor force participation 
across age groups. This is followed by analyses in section 3.5 introducing 
incentive measures for the old as the structural factor creating the basis for 
an eventual substitution of old for young jobs. Section 3.6 concludes the 
chapter.
3.2      Demographic Perspectives and Social Security Programs
The oﬃcial retirement age in Denmark deﬁ  ned as the time from which you 
become eligible for National Old Age Pension (OAP) is sixty- ﬁ  ve years from 
2004, reduced from sixty-  seven years.1 The actual average retirement age is 
lower, at around sixty- one to sixty- two years. Due to this, the ratio shown in 
ﬁ  gure 3.1 underestimates the impact from the coming demographic shift by 
depicting the conventional calculation of the sixty- ﬁ  ve years and older rela-
tive to the whole population and to the sixteen to sixty- four years old based 
on the most recent population forecast from Statistics Denmark.
With unchanged policies in the area of social security retirement pro-
grams, a forecast of more than a 20 percentage point increase in the depen-
dency ratio shown in ﬁ  gure 3.1 will have quite strong implications for public 
expenditures with derived implication for taxes and/  or public expenditures. 
Assuming unchanged labor force participation rates implies that the number 
of people in the labor force will go down and the consequence is a shrink-
ing tax base at the same time as the increasing pressure on the expenditure 
side occurs. An obvious policy reaction is to consider changes in the rules 
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2. Based on the work in a Government committee on Welfare, policy changes have been 
enacted to adjust the earliest ages of eligibility for both PEW and OAP programs to the average 
life expectancy. However, these changes become only eﬀective as from 2019.
expenditures and increasing the future tax base.2 The projected composition 
on age groups of the twenty- to sixty-  four-  years-  old is shown in ﬁ  gure 3.2. 
The share of young workers twenty to twenty-  four years old is very stable 
for the whole forecast period up to 2050. It is seen that the main change in 
the ﬁ  rst twenty years is a 5 percentage point decline in the share of the prime 
age group, twenty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  four, followed by a nearly 5 percentage point 
decline in the share of workers ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four years old in the last 
twenty years of the forecast period.
As a background for the analyses in the subsequent sections, we present 
a brief survey of the Danish social security retirement programs. Regard-
ing the eventual substitution of young for old jobs, a number of important 
program innovations have occurred in the last quarter of a century. Until 
1979, National Old Age Pension (OAP) and social disability pension (SDP) 
were the only elements in the Social Security part of provision for retirement, 
along with unemployment or sickness beneﬁ  ts as a pathway to retirement. 
In 1977 a law-  preparing committee was appointed to make an outline for 
an early retirement program where eligibility, in contrast to social disabil-
ity pension, should depend on objective criteria and not on a visitation 
Fig. 3.1    The population sixty-  ﬁ  ve and older relative to the population and to the 
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3. Unemployment insurance is not mandatory in Denmark. Membership of so- called Ghent-
  type unemployment insurance funds is voluntary. The funds are administered by unions with 
revenues from membership fees and with the state as the actor carrying the residual ﬁ  nancial 
burden under recessions.
on medical and/  or social criteria. In the years before this committee was 
appointed, the union for unskilled workers had argued for the introduction 
of a program for early retirement where the target group was intended to 
be people with a long history of work in physically demanding jobs. The 
program was intended to be a more attractive option than disability pension. 
Based on this, the so-  called Post Employment Wage (PEW) was introduced 
in 1979 as an early retirement program with eligibility based solely on being 
at least sixty years old and having suﬃcient tenure as member of an unem-
ployment insurance fund.3
When the law introducing PEW was passed in parliament, one of the 
main arguments was that the program was supposed to be an element in 
labor market policy where a presumed fairly constant number of jobs should 
be redistributed from older workers (retiring early on the new program) to 
younger workers (among whom unemployment was high at the time). The 
secondary motive was to function as an alternative to disability pension 
for workers with a long record of physically demanding jobs. The main 
line of argument is expressed in a 1978 quote from the Minister of Labor, 
Svend Auken: “Unemployment among the youth is perhaps the most serious 
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problem of today, because we cannot hide from the fact that we risk losing a 
whole generation of young persons from the labor market and from society 
as a whole . . .” (Proceedings of Parliament, 1978). In the policy debate at 
the time of introduction of the program, counterarguments regarding the 
basic idea; that is, a more or less given number of jobs, was nearly absent. 
However, one member of parliament (chairman of a tax protest party at 
the time, called the Progress Party) named Mogens Glistrup in very colorful 
language expressed a deep skepticism regarding this argument: “This is a 
shimmering blue, lifelong-  lying illusion used to trick the people into think-
ing that this legislation will reduce the ranks of the unemployed . . . with so 
much as even one single individual . . . the laws of economics don’t work 
that way . . .” (Proceedings of Parliament, 1978).
The same basic motivation, a given number of jobs, was also used in the 
early 1980s to motivate other, smaller policy changes. This was the case 
regarding some of the elements in a pension reform of 1984, containing the 
following.
•   Stricter means testing of old age pension relative to earnings from 
work.
•    Cancellation of a—modest—actuarial element in the old age pension 
program where the motive was to increase economic incentives for older 
workers to leave the labor force at the ﬁ  rst eligible age.
Entry to the PEW program was very high compared to initial estimates 
in the policy preparation phase. Signiﬁ  cantly more men than women in the 
aﬀected age groups of sixty and above fulﬁ  lled the membership demands in 
the unemployment insurance funds. The very strong impact from the PEW 
program is illustrated in ﬁ  gure 3.3, which shows the labor force participa-
tion rate for men in the age group sixty to sixty-  four years from before the 
introduction of PEW to the most recent period. The data for the long period 
covered by ﬁ  gure 3.3 are from diﬀerent sources. Due to this, the decline in 
labor force participation at the time of introduction of PEW as shown in 
ﬁ  gure 3.3 may be biased somewhat upwards. The data for the years before 
PEW are either census data, 1960, 1965, and 1970, or survey-  based (while 
they are based on the Register- based Labour Force Statistics [RAS] register 
since 1980 where all persons are classiﬁ  ed relative to the labor market based 
on their main activity in the ﬁ  rst week of November in the preceding year). 
An alternative illustration of the impact on the employment rate for men 
sixty to sixty- four years old is shown following, using consistent data for the 
period 1971 to 2001 based on mandatory contributions to a universal labor 
market pension program called ATP (Danish Labor Market Supplementary 
Pension Fund).
Although other factors, including SDP and occupational pensions with 
early retirement options also inﬂ  uence the participation rates, the timing of 
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PEW program. Immediately after the introduction of the program in 1979 
the participation rate for the sixty-   to sixty-  four-  year-  old men goes down 
steeply from around 80 percent. Over the following twenty years participa-
tion declines further, with about 20 percentage points to close to half the 
pre-  PEW level. In 1999 a policy reform was enacted with the purpose of 
reducing the economic incentives for entry into the program. In ﬁ  gure 3.3, 
we notice a fairly strong increase in participation rates in the most recent 
years, which most probably is due to the reform in 1999 and a shift of the 
statistical criteria for drawing the line between retirement and in the labor 
force, implying that a number of individuals receiving the PEW beneﬁ  ts at 
the same time had earnings from work high enough to shift them into the 
employed category of workers. More liberal rules for combining PEW with 
earnings from some work was part of the 1999 reform. In section 3.3 we treat 
the labor market reactions to PEW in more detail.
Besides the PEW program, a more restricted early retirement program in 
the Social Security area, called the Transitional Beneﬁ  ts Program (TBP), was 
opened for long term unemployed people ﬁ  fty to ﬁ  fty- four years old in 1992. 
In 1994 eligibility was extended to ﬁ  fty- ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty- nine years old long term 
unemployed people. Entry was closed again in 1996. Beneﬁ  ts were set at 80 
percent of PEW beneﬁ  ts and those admitted to the program remained in it 
and were transferred to the PEW program by the age of sixty.
Fig. 3.3    Labor force participation rate for men, sixty to sixty-  four years old, 1960 
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4. By convention, the RAS data for a given year t indicates the state relative to the labor 
market for all individuals in November of year t – 1.
3.3      Description of Changes in Unemployment and Employment for 
Age Groups
A ﬁ  rst summary impression of the development in some relevant age-
  related labor market indicators is given in ﬁ  gure 3.4 for women and men 
together. Figure 3.4 is based on the RAS data, which are consistent for the 
period 1981 to 2006. The labor force participation rate for the old, deﬁ  ned 
as the ﬁ  fty- ﬁ  ve-  to sixty- four- year- old group, shows a moderate decline from 
1981 to the mid-  1980s. The RAS data has 1981 as the ﬁ  rst year, making it 
diﬃcult to illustrate the impact from the PEW that was shown for sixty-   to 
sixty- four- year- old men in ﬁ   gure 3.3.4 Based on alternative data we illustrate 
the change before and after the introduction of PEW. Further, the impact 
from the TBP on the labor force participation among people in their ﬁ  fties 
is clearly visible in ﬁ  gure 3.4.
For the young, ﬁ  gure 3.4 contains two indicators. The labor force partici-
pation rate is nearly constant until the late 1980s, followed by a decline of 
10 percentage points until the turn of the century. Unemployment shows 
big cyclical movements until the mid- 1990s around a high level, followed by 
a steep decline to a very low level at the end of the period. Based on ﬁ  gure 
Fig. 3.4    Labor force participation twenty to twenty-  four and ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four 
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3.4, there is no indication of any impact from PEW on youth unemploy-
ment. A fundamental policy change regarding unemployed younger than 
twenty- ﬁ   ve  enacted  in  1994  seems,  on  the  other  hand,  to  have  had  a  strong 
eﬀect on youth unemployment—supported by a general cyclical upturn 
beginning in 1994.
It is obviously interesting, considering the natural experiment nature of 
the introduction of PEW to go back beyond 1981. The problem with this 
approach is that we have to link diﬀerent series. This is illustrated in ﬁ  gures 
3.5 and 3.6, including the whole period from 1971. The RAS data as men-
tioned starts oﬀ in 1981. Before that, insurance-  based data are available 
reporting unemployment by age for full time insured workers twice a year, 
respectively, for January and July. The average values are shown in ﬁ  gure 3.5, 
which includes, for illustration, three overlapping years.
Finally, ﬁ  gure 3.6 shows the proﬁ  le for youth unemployment 1971 to 2006 
with the two series linked in 1981. The very strong increase, beginning at the 
time of the ﬁ  rst oil price shock, was part of the motivation for PEW (com-
pare to the previous discussion). On the other hand, just comparing trends 
in aggregate series, no impact is seen from PEW on youth unemployment.
In ﬁ  gure 3.7, covering the period 1981 to 2006, labor force participation 
for the young in ﬁ  gure 3.4 has been replaced with unemployment in the 
prime age group. It can be seen that unemployment for the two age groups 
correlate in the ﬁ  rst part of the period and practically become equal to each 
other since the late 1990s.
Finally, ﬁ  gure 3.8 collects labor force participation rates for the young, the 
Fig. 3.5    Unemployment, twenty to twenty-  four years old (1971 to 1983, no. of full- 
time insured unemployed/  no. of insured, 1981 to 2006, based on the RAS register)Fig. 3.6    Linked unemployment rate, twenty to twenty-  four years old, 1971 to 2006
Fig. 3.7    Labor force participation ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four years old and unemploy-
ment rates for the young, twenty to twenty-  four years, and the prime age group, 
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prime age group, and older workers ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve-   to sixty-  four-  years-  old in one 
graph. The most spectacular change is the decline in labor force participa-
tion among the young beginning in the late 1980s. The big changes for the 
group of older workers are not captured in ﬁ  gure 3.8 due to the series in the 
graph beginning after the PEW introduction and due to the aggregation of 
two groups below and above sixty years of age.
In ﬁ  gure 3.9 to 3.11 we extend the time scale to begin in 1971; that is, 
before the ﬁ  rst oil price shocks and before the enactment of PEW. Figure 
3.9 shows the employment share for men and women combined and disag-
gregating to two age groups in their ﬁ  fties and the PEW relevant sixty-   to 
sixty- four- year- old group. The employment data are from the microdata set 
and are complete for the age groups included here. Looking ﬁ  rst at the old-
est group, the falling employment rate until introduction of PEW is aﬀected 
by the cyclical downturn after the oil price shock, where older workers who 
became unemployed subsequently had great diﬃculties entering a new job. 
The impact from PEW is clearly visible until the leveling-  oﬀ in the employ-
ment rate as the economy moves up strongly in the mid-  1990s.
Figures 3.10 and 3.11 show the proﬁ  les over time for men and women 
separately. It has been mentioned before that a higher proportion of men 
fulﬁ  lled the conditions for entering PEW. As a consequence of that, the 
impact from PEW is much more pronounced and concentrated in time for 
men. For women the cohort eﬀect implies that employment rates for women 
Fig. 3.8    Labor force participation rates, twenty to twenty-  four, twenty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty- 
four and ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four years old, 1981 to 2006Fig. 3.9    Employment rates, ﬁ  fty to sixty-  four years old, 1971 to 2001 (based on 
microdata)
Fig. 3.10    Employment rates, ﬁ  fty to sixty-  four years old, men, 1971 to 2001 (based 
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in their ﬁ  fties are stable or slightly increasing up to the same level to which 
the rates for men are decreasing.
The data covering the longer period are based on microdata where employ-
ment is derived from payment of contributions to a mandatory pension called 
ATP. To evaluate the validity of the ATP- based data relative to the RAS data, 
we have looked into the diﬀerence between male employment in diﬀerent 
age groups using the two data sources for an overlapping period. The overall 
impression is that the two employment series are highly correlated and can 
substitute for each other in regressions with a level diﬀerence only.
Finally, ﬁ  gure 3.12 extends ﬁ  gure 3.7 by including the years 1971 to 1980. 
In the recession years 1974 to 1983, the employment rate for older work-
ers declines at the same time as unemployment goes up, most pronounced 
for the young, but also for the prime age group. From the mid-  1980s to the 
mid-  1990s unemployment moves cyclically around a high level for both age 
groups, while employment for the older workers continues the downward 
trend. Finally, from the mid-  1990s a cyclical upturn begins with unemploy-
ment rates going down steeply while employment stabilizes among the older 
workers. Comparing these trends does not lend support to a substitution 
going on between jobs for the old and the young or the prime age group. 
In the next two sections we go on to examine this question in a regression 
setting.
Fig. 3.11    Employment rates, ﬁ  fty to sixty-  four years old, women, 1971 to 2001 
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3.4      Elderly Employment and Youth and Prime Age Activity
In this section we move from graphical evidence in the previous section 
to presenting descriptive ordinary least squares (OLS) time series regres-
sions of youth and prime age activity explained by elderly employment. This 
allows a more careful description by controlling for a number of factors by 
covariates or transformations of the data. Coeﬃcients on elderly employ-
ments from these various transformations with and without controls are 
presented in table 3.1.
The upper panel reports coeﬃcients from regressions without additional 
covariates. The lower panel controls for gross national product (GNP), GNP 
growth, and manufacturing employment share. Dependent variables are 
rates throughout, and within each panel the four lines represent diﬀerent 
transformations of the data. First, we regress on untransformed levels (of 
rates) on levels; second, we regress levels on three-  year lags to allow for a 
time lag in the response; third, we regress ﬁ  ve-  year diﬀerences on ﬁ  ve-  year 
diﬀerences; and fourth, we regress log of ﬁ  ve-  year diﬀerences on log of 
ﬁ  ve-  year diﬀerences where the transformations rid the data of nonstation-
arities.
The ﬁ  rst three columns show youth behavior and the last two columns 
Fig. 3.12    The employment rate, ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four years old, and the unem-
ployment rates for young, twenty to twenty-  four, and prime age group, twenty-  ﬁ  ve to 
ﬁ  fty-  four, 1971 to 2001112        Paul Bingley, Nabanita Datta Gupta, and Peder J. Pedersen
Table 3.1  Direct relationship between elderly employment and youth and prime 
age activity













Levels –0.407 –0.044 –4.180 –0.164 –0.175
0.210 0.055 0.187 0.031 0.020
3- year  lag 0.109 0.023 –3.412 –0.086 –0.143
0.213 0.058 0.219 0.034 0.022
5- year 
diﬀerence
–2.600 –0.049 –2.466 –0.376 –0.159
0.509 0.243 0.638 0.117 0.081
5- year  log 
diﬀerence
–4.981 0.034 –0.659 –3.147 –0.086
1.516 0.151 0.169 1.187 0.056
With controls
Levels –2.691 –0.088 –2.764 –0.391 –0.212
0.255 0.153 0.348 0.070 0.055
3- year  lag –1.845 0.004 –1.747 –0.0261 –0.223
0.396 0.163 0.478 0.085 0.058
5- year 
diﬀerence
–3.254 –0.390 –3.182 –0.433 –0.279
0.652 0.362 0.937 0.177 0.124
5- year  log 
diﬀerence   
–3.774 0.020 –0.241 –1.374 –0.158
4.039   0.363   0.447   3.145   0.112
prime age work. Focusing on the results for the youth (with no controls 
added), an increase in elderly employment in the diﬀerenced speciﬁ  cations 
has a statistically signiﬁ  cant and negative impact on youth unemployment 
but no eﬀect in the levels or three- year lag speciﬁ  cation. This ﬁ  nding does not 
carry over to eﬀects on youth employment, however, which are insigniﬁ  cant 
no matter which transformation of the data is being considered. On the 
other hand, in both levels and diﬀerences, youth enrollment is signiﬁ  cantly 
reduced when elderly employment increases. Thus, the evidence suggests 
either complementarity or no relationship at all between elderly and young 
labor. For prime aged workers, we ﬁ  nd again that unemployment is signiﬁ  -
cantly reduced when elderly employment increases but that no clear statis-
tical relationship between elderly employment and prime age employment 
can be discerned.
Adding controls for GNP, GNP growth, and manufacturing share rein-
forces the patterns found previously in the case of the ﬁ  rst three transforma-
tions: that is, youth unemployment is signiﬁ  cantly reduced, no signiﬁ  cant 
eﬀect is found for youth employment, and youth enrollment decreases sig-
niﬁ  cantly. For prime aged workers, adding controls results in both unem-
ployment and employment being signiﬁ  cantly reduced when elderly employ-
ment increases, which on the face of it appears somewhat puzzling. In the 
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both youth and the prime aged become imprecise and all statistical signiﬁ  -
cance vanishes.
To summarize, the results from table 3.1 in which we seek to establish a 
direct relationship between elderly employment and youth (and prime age) 
activity turn up no evidence that an increase in elderly employment crowds 
out youth employment. Rather, in the instances where we can discern a clear 
relationship, youth unemployment and youth enrollment tend to decrease 
as elderly employment increases, suggesting complementarity between these 
worker groups.
3.5      Retirement Incentives and Employment
One concern with the correlations presented in the previous section is that 
the time series might have common but unobserved determinants. To make 
a more credible claim about measuring the eﬀect of elderly employment on 
youth and prime age workers we use variation in social security provision for 
the elderly. Our previous work has shown that, based on individual micro-
data, more generous social security provision for the elderly induces earlier 
retirement. The challenge now is to aggregate up from an individual-  based 
incentive to a summary index of the annual incentives to retire for the elderly 
together. A higher value of this index should reduce total elderly employ-
ment, consistent with micro evidence. Assuming that retirement incentives 
aﬀect younger workers only through their eﬀect on elderly employment, the 
correlation between the summary index and youth and prime age activity 
indicates a direct eﬀect of elderly employment on younger workers.
A summary index of retirement incentives needs to incorporate social 
security eligibility conditions and levels and trajectories of potential entitle-
ments for retiring now and later. Concepts of social security wealth (SSW) 
and peak value (PV) developed in Gruber and Wise (1999) and used in our 
previous work have been found to capture incentives well at the individual 
level. The SSW is the discounted present value of social security beneﬁ  ts 
received from the present until death, if retiring this year. It is assumed 
that individuals discount the future at 3 percent per year, use age-  gender 
life tables (1980 life table is used 1980 to 1989, 1990 life table for 1990 to 
1999, and so forth, but assuming no chance of survival beyond age 100) 
and believe that current social security rules will remain in force indeﬁ  nitely. 
At the current age an individual can calculate SSW for retiring this year 
and for staying in work until retirement at any future age (assumed latest 
age eighty). For future retirement, intervening net earnings predictions are 
assumed calculated from age- speciﬁ  c means in the current year. Comparing 
SSW for retiring in this and all future years we can obtain PV, which is the 
maximum.
In order to capture variation in incentives across the population and over 
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(the midpoints of deciles of the earnings distribution)  2 genders  2 
marital states  3 pension program eligibilities (post employment wage, 
or public employees pension, or neither)  2 disability states (eligible for 
social and disability pension or not)  31 years (1971 to 2001). Our aim is 
to collapse incentive measures from these 7,440 simulated individuals into 
thirty-  one annual summary indexes to be used in time series regressions. 
The index should reﬂ  ect the retirement incentives faced by currently retired 
individuals when they were still in the labor force.
In order to explain construction of the index, consider a simpliﬁ  ed ex-
ample for the sake of illustration where we want to construct the index for 
1990. Assume ﬁ  rst age of social security eligibility is sixty. Those currently 
retired and aged sixty in 1990 must have retired in 1990 and the relevant 
incentive measure is obviously the mean incentive measure (a function of 
SSW and PV) for sixty-  year-  olds in 1990. Those currently retired and aged 
sixty-  one in 1990 could have retired aged sixty in 1989 or aged sixty-  one in 
1990. A mean incentive measure for these currently retired sixty-  one-  year-
  olds needs to weight them according to their chance of being exposed to 
these incentives at these ages: employment rate of ﬁ  fty-  nine-  year-  olds in 
1988 and sixty-  year-  olds in 1989, respectively. This can be extended until, 
say, those currently retired and aged sixty-  six in 1990—who could have 
retired at sixty in 1984, sixty-  one in 1985, sixty-  six in 1990—and combined 
with relative exposure weights: employment rates of ﬁ  fty-  nine-  year-  olds in 
1983, sixty in 1984, sixty-  ﬁ  ve in 1989, respectively. Hence, for the stock of 
current retirees aged sixty to sixty-  six in 1990 we have seven incentive mea-
sures. Together these are weighted by the proportion of retirees of each age 
to form a single measure.
Consider the following function of SSW and PV, which should be aggre-
gated
I(a, y, )  SSW(a, y)   [SSW(a, y)  PV(a, y)],
where an individual at age a in year y is giving the gains delaying retirement 
(within square brackets) weight . This weighting allows discounting of 
future gains beyond the 3 percent already accounted for in SSW and PV 
calculation:   0 implies myopia and disregarding future gains,   1 
implies no departure from standard discounting. Variable  is determined by 
comparing goodness- of- ﬁ   t from OLS regressions explaining elderly employ-
ment by GNP, GNP growth, manufacturing employment share, and I() 
calculated using diﬀerent values for . We tried  in the range 0 through 1.50 
in steps of 0.25 and found 1.25 yielded the highest R- squared.
Simulated individuals are ﬁ  rst assumed to be at risk of retirement at age 
ﬁ  fty and must retire at (the latest) age eighty. In order to calculate weights 
it is necessary to back-  cast earnings trajectories and employment proba-
bilities. We observe the distribution of earnings in microdata back to 1977 
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deﬂ  ating with wage inﬂ  ation. Employment microdata is observed back to 
1964 and before that date we assume employment by age and gender to be 
constant at the 1964 level.
Diﬀerent potential routes to retirement are captured by simulated indi-
viduals with eligibilities for social and disability pension, post employment 
wage, public employee pension, or combinations of these. Combining these 
routes into a single SSW and PV for each individual involves a straight-
forward comparison of alternative routes to ﬁ  nd the relevant maximum 
path. Further to the procedure previously described for aggregating over 
individuals, diﬀerent exit routes require scaling according to the proportion 
of those retiring by program. We observe diﬀerent exit routes back to 1977 
and assume the diﬀerent exit route weighting before 1977 is constant at the 
1977 level.
Having constructed the annual retirement incentive index, we can now 
run a time series OLS regression explaining labor market activity. Estimates 
of the coeﬃcient on retirement incentive index for various speciﬁ  cations 
are presented in table 3.2. The upper panel reports coeﬃcients from regres-
sions without additional covariates. The lower panel controls for GNP, 
GNP growth, and manufacturing employment share. Dependent variables 
are rates throughout and within each panel the four lines represent diﬀerent 
transformations of the data. First, we regress on untransformed levels (of 
rates) on levels; second, we regress levels on three- year lags, third, we regress 
Table 3.2  Retirement incentives and elderly, youth and prime age activity

















Levels 0.037 –0.189 0.058 0.003 0.788 0.029 0.033
0.007 0.009 0.042 0.011 0.053 0.007 0.004
3- year  lag 0.029 –0.145 –0.050 –0.008 0.647 0.014 0.026
0.008 0.013 0.041 0.011 0.059 0.007 0.005
5- year 
diﬀerence
0.009 –0.105 0.215 –0.051 0.089 0.029 0.017
0.025 0.022 0.103 0.036 0.122 0.020 0.013
5- year  log 
diﬀerence
–0.028 –0.238 0.759 –0.042 0.076 0.304 0.032
0.360 0.038 0.531 0.045 0.064 0.404 0.016
With controls
Levels 0.023 –0.147 0.345 –0.015 0.346 0.049 0.034
0.018 0.019 0.078 0.027 0.091 0.016 0.010
3- year  lag 0.017 –0.093 0.150 –0.022 0.150 0.032 0.026
0.021 0.029 0.100 0.030 0.109 0.018 0.013
5- year 
diﬀerence
–0.010 –0.061 0.028 –0.048 –0.033 –0.004 0.028
0.037 0.030 0.146 0.055 0.176 0.030 0.020
5- year  log 
diﬀerence 
–0.489 –0.186 –0.369 –0.089 –0.063 –0.576 0.023
0.584   0.042   0.968   0.080   0.103   0.716   0.027116        Paul Bingley, Nabanita Datta Gupta, and Peder J. Pedersen
ﬁ  ve-  year diﬀerences on ﬁ  ve year diﬀerences; and fourth, we regress log of 
ﬁ  ve-  year diﬀerences on log of ﬁ  ve-  year diﬀerences.
The ﬁ  rst two columns show the impact of incentives on work behavior 
of the elderly. These show consistently negative (positive) signiﬁ  cant eﬀects 
of retirement incentives on elderly employment (unemployment). Columns 
(3) through (5) show youth behavior and the last two columns prime age 
work. To the extent that signs for elderly and younger groups are the same 
(opposite) we can think of them as being complements (substitutes) for each 
other in the labor market. With the exception of prime age employment, 
these younger workers are, if anything, found to be complements for the 
elderly in that they move together.
Prime age employment and unemployment have the same sign, which is 
somewhat counterintuitive. This was also the case in the previous section, 
where elderly employment directly explained prime age activity—prime age 
unemployment had an anomalous sign. A similar explanation is in order 
here, too. Consider again ﬁ  gure 3.13, where it can be seen that prime age 
employment and unemployment trend together for most of the observation 
period until the cyclical upturn starting in the mid-  1990s, largely reﬂ  ecting 
secular trends in labor force participation, especially among women, which 
explains why the share outside the labor force for the prime age group has 
gone down.
Fig. 3.13    The employment and unemployment rate, prime age group, twenty-  ﬁ  ve to 
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3.6    Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter has been to describe and investigate the rela-
tionship between elderly employment and the employment, unemployment, 
and educational enrollment of young and prime aged workers in the Danish 
economy. In particular, we studied whether older workers leaving the labor 
force by way of early retirement programs freed up job opportunities for 
younger workers. Denmark presented a good test case for this substitu-
tion hypothesis because of the sharp drop in labor force participation of 
the elderly, which occurred following the introduction of the PEW. This 
key reform and other policy reforms occurring over the period were largely 
fueled by a concern over rising youth unemployment at the time and pro-
vided the variation used to identify eﬀects of elderly labor force participation 
on other segments of the labor market.
Examining linked microdata spanning a long time period, we ﬁ  nd no 
observable relationship between trends in employment of the older and 
younger age groups. Similarly, the statistical evidence does not indicate 
that older workers and younger workers are substitutes. On the contrary, 
our regression results suggest that if anything, young workers are comple-
ments for the elderly in Denmark because youth employment tends to rise 
and fall together with elderly employment. For prime age workers, on the 
other hand, both employment and unemployment tend to rise with elderly 
employment, but this is most likely driven by the secular increase in female 
labor force participation over the period, bringing more prime aged workers 
into the labor market.
Reference
Gruber, J., and D. Wise, eds. 1999. Social Security and retirement around the world. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.